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FEDERALISM AS A PROBLEM OF GOVERNANCE, NOT OF 
DOCTRINAL WARFARE 
EDWARD L. RUBIN* 
I.  FROM DOCTRINE TO GOVERNANCE IN FEDERALISM SCHOLARSHIP 
Heather Gerken’s call for a détente in the “merry war” between nationalists 
and federalists is a welcome one.
1
 That is not because this war is hurting 
anyone; unlike real wars, which invariably shed blood and lead to loss of life, 
academic wars are the lifeblood of their scholarly combatants. The problem 
with this particular war is not its casualties but its casuistries. Its participants 
attack each other with arguments based on different premises and divergent 
definitions, each designed to make their own conclusions appear irrefutable. 
One result is that the war not only lacks the dreadful finality of real combat, 
but also the more benign and satisfying finality of competitive sports; nothing 
ever gets resolved. An even more unfortunate result, however, is that the 
participants have been distracted from the truly interesting and important 
questions that lie just beyond the field of their bootless battle. 
Everyone who has ever addressed the issue of American federalism, 
according to whatever definition he or she has chosen to wield, must agree to 
the following propositions, which are truly irrefutable. First, both the national 
government and the state governments carry out a great many governmental 
functions. Second, neither the national government nor the state governments 
are going to disappear in the foreseeable future. Third, these two sets of 
governments must deal with each other on a continuous basis in order to carry 
out their tasks. Fourth, this relationship between them involves the variations 
and complexities that invariably arise when large institutions interact. An only 
slightly less unarguable point is that the interaction reveals a level of 
complexity that resembles the famous Mandelbrot set, where increasing levels 
of detailed scrutiny, instead of getting past the areas of overlap, only reveal 




* University Professor of Law and Political Science, Vanderbilt University. 
 1. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?, 59 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 997, 997 (2015). 
 2. See BENOIT B. MANDELBROT, FRACTALS AND CHAOS: THE MANDELBROT SET AND 
BEYOND 12–19 (2004) (describing the complexity of Mandelbrot sets). 
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The fractal complexity of federal-state relations may be seen as an 
affliction or an opportunity, but one thing about it seems reasonably clear, 
perhaps close to irrefutable: as Professor Gerken points out, it is unlikely to be 
resolved by the judiciary.
3
 A few decades ago, the Legal Process School, still 
the dominant approach to judicial doctrine in the legal academy, was 
convinced that it had interred the doctrine of federalism in its entirety.
4
 Then 
the Supreme Court decided to raise it from the dead, striking down a few 
federal statutes under the Commerce Clause,
5
 fashioning the novel doctrine of 
forbidden commandeering
6
 and, most recently, invalidating conditions attached 
to federal funding through an equally novel rationale of excessive compulsion.
7
 
At most, however, these decisions do little more than nibble at the edges of 
comprehensive federal authority; like the Walking Dead, they would be easy 
targets for an aggressive Congress that was determined to return them to their 
graves. There is simply no chance that the Court will impose any major 
limitation on federal authority, and no possibility that it could disentangle state 
and national authority. 
When legal scholars continue their war over the intricacies of this 
marginally important doctrine, therefore, they distract themselves from the 
 
 3. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1030. 
 4. The decision that seemed to have confirmed federalism’s demise was Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530–31, 555–56 (1985). For the Legal Process 
argument supporting the decision, see JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL 
POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 
171–259 (1980) (arguing questions regarding the separation of state and national power are best 
left to the political process and not the Court); D. Bruce La Pierre, Political Accountability in the 
National Political Process—The Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 NW. U. 
L. REV. 577 (1986); and Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of 
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 
558–60 (1954) (Congress is better suited to manage federalism issues than the courts). 
 5. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601–02 (2000) (holding the civil damages 
provision of the Violence Against Women Act unconstitutional); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 unconstitutional). See 
Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism: Power and Perspective 
in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1199, 1201 (2003) (examining recent 
commerce clause cases including Lopez and Morrison where the Court has limited Congressional 
power). 
 6. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding enforcement provisions of the 
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act unconstitutional); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144, 149 (1992) (holding enforcement provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
Amendments Act of 1985 unconstitutional). See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and 
Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2182, 2200 (1998) (discussing 
Printz and its effects upon Federal commandeering). 
 7. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012) (holding a provision 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that made all Medicaid payments to a state 
conditional on the state’s participation in Medicaid expansion unconstitutional). 
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irrefutable reality of American government: the on-going, complex, and wide-
ranging interaction between the national government and the state 
governments. In recent years, however, as Professor Gerken notes, there has 
been a salutary tendency to leave the churned up battlefield of these doctrinal 
issues behind and focus on this interaction.
8
 It can be described as a shift from 
questions of doctrine to questions of governance, a trend evident in other fields 
of legal scholarship as well.
9
 Although the new approach dispenses with the 
intricate analysis of judicial opinions that characterized its predecessor, it must 
not be regarded as abandoning the study of law, the way traditionalists might 
claim. The statutes that necessarily authorize federal action, and that typically 
authorize action by the states, are law. The regulations promulgated by federal 
and state agencies to implement these statutes are law. The agreements that 
these agencies enter into with each other, and the internal memoranda that they 
each produce to govern their relations to the other are law as well. If we lack 
familiar categories and criteria for analyzing these various pronouncements, 
that is simply a limitation of our traditional approach that must be overcome, 
not any indication of these pronouncements’ less-than-legal character. 
In her Childress Article, Professor Gerken raises a series of interesting 
questions that emerge from the governance approach to federal-state relations. 
The first question that I will discuss in this brief Comment is a descriptive one: 
what purposes are served by this complex relationship between two levels of 
government? The second is normative: is the existence of this relationship a 
good or bad thing for the nation’s citizens? 
 
 8. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1012–22. 
 9. Most obviously evident in the New Public Governance school. See Orly Lobel, The 
Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal 
Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004) (introducing the new governance model and challenging 
the traditional model of formal regulation). For examples of this approach, see Lisa T. Alexander, 
Afterword–Part III: Reflections on Success and Failure in New Governance and the Role of the 
Lawyer, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 737 (discussing New Governance, the role of lawyers, and the impact 
on legal education); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 281–82, 472 (1998) (identifying and discussing 
“Democratic Experimentalism”); Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought 
and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471 
(2004) (discussing the new governance model in light of The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation 
and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive 
Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1234, 1254 (1995) (arguing the Eco-Management 
and Audit Scheme best illustrates reflexive environmental law); Edward Rubin, The Myth of 
Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2084 (2005) 
(noting that pro-federalism arguments can be formal or functional and that Printz embodies a 
functional argument); and Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A 
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 553–555 (2001) (identifying reasons opposition 
to a structural shift in addressing second generation bias would prove futile). 
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II.  THE PURPOSES OF TWO-LEVEL GOVERNMENT 
In assessing the purposes served by America’s two-level government, it is 
necessary to be clear about the terminology, even at the risk of revisiting the 
battlefield of doctrinal federalism debates. Professor Gerken identifies her 
governance-oriented approach as part of the “nationalist school” of federalism, 
which she defines as insisting that “devolution can further nationalist aims.”
10
 
This is, she mentions at various points, “not our father’s federalism.”
11
 The 
phrase comes from pop culture pundits, who point out that the music being 
written today is “not your father’s rock’n roll.” While the point is undoubtedly 
right, it allows for a considerable range of rejected parentage, from The 
Penguins’ “Earth Angel”
12
 to Bryan Adams’s “Heaven.”
13
 Similarly, Professor 
Gerken’s formulation could range from the Founding Fathers to our scholarly 
fathers of the Legal Process movement. 
The Founding Fathers’ federalism may well have been nationalist, in 
Professor Gerken’s sense: George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, James 
Wilson, and a number of other paternal figures in our nation, including perhaps 
James Madison at the time the Constitution was drafted, were all committed to 
a dominant central government.
14
 They recognized, however, that most 
governmental functions in the new nation would be carried out by the states, 
and that the new national government would need to cooperate with them 
closely. This was not a product of the Framers’ design, but of Britain’s North 
American colonial policy. There was no unified British administration in North 
America: the thirteen colonies were regarded as separate entities, each having 
its own founding documents, its own governing bodies, and its own 
relationship with the British government (the Board of Trade, the Secretaries 
of State, and the Privy Council).
15
 When the Revolution occurred, the colonies 
became states by taking over the existing colonial governments, but they were 
 
 10. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1001. 
 11. Id. at 1006. 
 12. THE PENGUINS, Earth Angel, on EARTH ANGEL / HEY SENORITA (Dootone Records 
1954). 
 13. BRYAN ADAMS, Heaven, on RECKLESS (A&M Records 1984). 
 14. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 161–202 (1996) (discussing the framers’ views on Federalism as deduced 
from their writings); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–
1787, at 463–564 (1969) (discussing the conditions which led to constitutional reform of the 
central government by the Federalists). As both authors point out, there were, of course, 
dissenting voices among the Framers who expressed concern about the scope of central 
government authority. 
 15. See SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE: VOL. 
1, PREHISTORY TO 1789, at 84–155, 243–48 (1965); ALAN TAYLOR, AMERICAN COLONIES 117–
272 (Eric Foner ed., 2001); CARL UBBELOHDE, THE AMERICAN COLONIES AND THE BRITISH 
EMPIRE 1607–1763, at 12–26 (Arthur S. Link ed., 2d ed. 1975). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2015] FEDERALISM AS A PROBLEM OF GOVERNANCE, NOT OF DOCTRINAL WARFARE 1121 
required to develop national institutions for the first time, and these were 
improvised on a makeshift, emergency basis. Thus, the new nation was 
inevitably federalist, in the sense that the states exercised extensive, often 
dominant governmental power. 
Whether the Legal Process scholars were nationalists, in any sense, is an 
interesting question, but their main concern was the scope of judicial 
authority.
16
 On the basis of the institutional analysis that was perhaps the 
defining feature of their approach, they argued that courts should only use their 
constitutional power to reverse majoritarian decisions when individual rights 
are at stake. The relationship between the national government and the states 
can be safely left to the political process, they insisted; judicial involvement is 
not only unnecessary, but unlikely to be effective, and will only squander the 
legitimacy of the constitutional courts.
17
 
It is thus notable that both of these two plausible candidates for parentage 
of our current approach to federalism endorse one of the propositions that 
Professor Gerken advances so convincingly: that federal-state relations will be 
negotiated by the political process, and that they cannot be understood unless 
one pays attention to that process. The origin of the views that she opposes lies 
between the two and can be described as the classic phase of American 
federalism scholarship, perhaps corresponding to Led Zeppelin’s “Stairway to 
Heaven”
18
 or Bob Dylan’s “Knocking on Heaven’s Door.”
19
 This was the 
period when the federal courts fashioned and enforced a federalism doctrine 
that imposed limits on the national government’s authority to engage in various 
regulatory activities. It was a doctrine that the Founding Fathers had not yet 
envisioned, and that the Legal Process School explicitly rejected, and it is the 
main matter of contention in the merry war to which Professor Gerken refers. 
But if both the Founding Fathers and the Legal Process School can be 
regarded as endorsing Professor Gerken’s point about the precedence of 
politically based decisions, they ignore her second point about the managerial 
 
 16. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 35 (1962); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE 
COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY 183, 186–87, 191, 193 (1960); Lon L. Fuller, The 
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 354, 368 (1978); David L. Shapiro, 
The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 
HARV. L. REV. 921, 922, 930 (1965); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3, 6–7, 9 (1959). Although Fuller’s article was only 
published in 1978, it circulated in draft during the late 1950s and was quite influential at the time. 
 17. For two leading statements of this approach by scholars who can be fairly described as 
children of these Legal Process parents, see CHOPER, supra note 4, at 2, 188, 258; and JOHN 
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 181–83 (1980). 
 18. LED ZEPPELIN, Stairway to Heaven, on LED ZEPPELIN IV (Atlantic Records 1972). 
 19. BOB DYLAN, Knockin’ On Heaven’s Door, on PAT GARRETT AND BILLY THE KID (CBS 
1973). 
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nature of this decision-making process. At the time of the Founding Fathers, 
even European nations had only begun thinking about government in 
managerial or administrative terms,
20
 and these aborning thoughts were even 
harder to conceptualize in a nation largely consisting of some isolated clearings 
in the forest. Legal Process scholars, who had the advantage of two centuries 
of history and nearly a century of administrative governance at the national 
level,
21
 were certainly aware of the issue, but could barely discern it through 
the din and haze of their doctrinal warfare. It is in this sense that the 
contemporary focus on managerial or governance issues is truly not “our 
father’s federalism,” whether we identify that parent as the Founding Fathers, 
the Legal Process School, or the intervening doctrinalists. 
It is at this point in the analysis, however, that clarification is required. As 
Professor Gerken notes, one major managerial issue at stake in the interaction 
between the national and state governments is the level of decentralization.
22
 
With respect to virtually any task of governance, a highly relevant and 
important question is whether that task is more effectively implemented at a 
central or regional level. In some cases, uniformity is crucial, or there are 
major economies of scale; in others, responsiveness to diverse communities is 
of more concern, and large-scale structures prove unwieldy. Of course, federal 
agencies can decentralize on their own. Most agencies that regulate or provide 
services within our borders, such as the Federal Reserve System or the Social 
Security Administration, have regional offices. But states, because they are 
well-established governmental institutions and have extremely high 
 
 20. France first adopted a modern, managerial approach to government during the 
Revolution, which began after the Constitution was drafted. Austria adopted it during the reign of 
Emperor Joseph II, 1780–90. Britain, always precocious in matters of governance, began to 
develop this approach in the seventeenth century, but only brought it to fruition under William 
Pitt the Younger. EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR 
THE MODERN STATE 29–34 (2005). The first theoretical writers to focus on management or 
administration were probably the German Cameralists. ALBION W. SMALL, THE CAMERALISTS: 
THE PIONEERS OF GERMAN SOCIAL POLITY 2, 6 (1909); ANDRE WAKEFIELD, THE DISORDERED 
POLICE STATE: GERMAN CAMERALISM AS SCIENCE AND PRACTICE (2009). Their work began in 
the mid-eighteenth century, but it is unlikely that anyone in the thirteen colonies was familiar 
with it. 
 21. For the origins of the administrative state at the national level, see THOMAS K. 
MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, JAMES 
M. LANDIS, ALFRED E. KAHN 57–79 (1984); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW 
AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920, at 
3–4 (1982); RUBIN, supra note 20, at 34–36. Recent scholarship suggests an even longer history. 
See BRIAN BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT: THE MYSTERY OF NATIONAL AUTHORITY 
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2009) (exploring the evolution and exercise of national 
power in the nineteenth-century); see JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012) 
(discussing the early development of administrative law to reveal its “enduring structure”). 
 22. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1001–07. 
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recognition factors (how many people know which Social Security Region 
their city of residence belongs to?), are often the best modality for 
decentralization. 
Malcolm Feeley and I have argued that decentralization should be 
distinguished from federalism.
23
 We note that every nation larger than the 
Vatican is decentralized and that virtually every nation, right down to 
Luxembourg, has the same three levels of authority distribution—national, 
regional, and local—as the United States. If decentralization counts as 
federalism, then every nation in the world is federal. There is, however, a well-
recognized distinction between nations where all legal authority is held by the 
central government, which then decentralizes as a matter of policy, and nations 
where sub-national governments possess some set of autonomy rights and the 
central government is precluded from countermanding or undermining those 
rights. To take non-controversial examples, France, China (PRC), Japan, and 
the Netherlands belong in the former category, while Canada, Belgium, India, 
and Switzerland belong in the latter. What term should we use to indicate this 
distinction? All these nations employ various forms of decentralization, and 
their national-regional interactions all display the same Mandelbrot-like 
imbrications as American government. Professor Feeley and I argue that the 
perfectly good, if less than inspiring, term “decentralization” should be used 
for the managerial process and that the term “federalism” should be reserved 
for nations in the second group that grant juridical rights of some sort to sub-
national governmental units. 
For American scholars, the problem with this use of terminology is, of 
course, America. Professor Gerken notes that our national government can do 
virtually anything it chooses to,
24
 as the Legal Process School argued and as 
the courts in the post-War decades held. The Supreme Court’s recent efforts to 
breathe life into federalism as a legal constraint on national authority have 
been largely symbolic; the real issues, as she says, are the managerial ones, 
which are highly complex and merit extensive scholarly attention. But it is also 
true that Americans identify their mode of government as a federal one, and 
more specifically as “our federalism.” If one wants to honor this self-
designation, as Professor Gerken does, instead of challenging it, as Professor 
Feeley and I do, then it will be necessary to find another term for those nations 
which grant definitive and significant autonomy rights to sub-national units. In 
the interest of getting on with the important task of analyzing decentralization 
and other managerial practices, and escaping from the casuistry-strewn 
 
 23. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND 
TRAGIC COMPROMISE 20–29 (2008); Edward L. Rubin, Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of 
America, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 37, 39 (2001); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm 
Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 910 (1994). 
 24. Gerken, supra note 1, at 998. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1124 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1117 
battlefield of our father’s federalism, the grant of autonomy rights might be 
described as “juridical federalism.” 
This terminology carries an implication that the autonomy rights granted to 
sub-units can be enforced by the courts, or, more specifically, by an 
independent government institution that adjudicates disputes between persons 
and institutions within the nation. As a matter of practice, this is in fact the 
case throughout most of the world, but it is not essential to the definition. 
Something other than a court, such as a specially constituted council, could be 
used instead. In that case, the sub-units would have the autonomy necessary for 
the nation to count as juridically federalist, but that status would be instantiated 
by something other than “rights.” What may be crucial to the concept of 
juridical federalism is that the institution that places limits on the central 
government, and protects or validates the autonomy rights of the sub-unit, must 
be politically independent from the central government. This would seem to be 
implicit in the notion that the sub-units possess definitive and enforceable 
autonomy. 
A federal nation need not be a democracy. European monarchies during 
the feudal era fit comfortably into the definition of juridical federalism. As 
Hannah Arendt points out, these were regimes that were clearly governed by 
law, even though their public officials were not elected by the populace;
25
 
medieval counts, earls, and sometimes even petty castellans had definitive and 
enforceable rights against the king.
26
 Modern totalitarian nations present a 
closer question. Like all nations, they must decentralize authority; while an 
individual or single corporate body may have the authority to make any 
decision, it cannot, as a practical matter, possibly make all decisions. But 
would we be willing to describe a totalitarian nation as federal if the leader 
granted autonomy rights to political sub-units, subject only to the leader’s 
ability to countermand that grant? This was in fact the situation in the Soviet 
Union during certain periods.
27
 Like all definitional questions, it does not yield 
 
 25. HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE: EIGHT EXERCISES IN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT 96–97 (1993). 
 26. See ANTONY BLACK, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN EUROPE, 1250–1450, at 152–55 (1992) 
(discussing the relationship between the king and the law); JOSEPH CANNING, A HISTORY OF 
MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT, 300–1450, at 59–64 (1996) (discussing the feudal form of 
fidelity and its effects on the king and his magnates); Janet Nelson, Kingship and Empire, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT C. 350–C. 1450, 211, 211–51 (J.H. 
Burns ed.,1988) (discussing the evolution of the understanding of a king’s realm from c. 750 to 
c. 1150 into a “territorial and sociological entity” wherein the king shared power with the 
aristocracy and the Church). 
 27. See MARTIN MCCAULEY, THE SOVIET UNION, 1917–1991, at 111–27, 156–65 (2d ed. 
1993) (discussing the nationalist policy in soviet Russia and describing the autonomy issues that 
sprung up from the acceptance of new republics into the Soviet Union). 
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to empirical determination; the important point, as generally the case with such 
questions, is to be clear. 
I have proposed one further definitional distinction regarding federalism, 
or juridical federalism if one prefers. This is the distinction between 
comprehensive and particularized federalism.
28
 In some cases, a nation is 
entirely divided into provinces or states that all possess equivalent autonomy 
rights, as is the case with Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, and India.
29
 
Sometimes, as in the original United States,
30
 this form of federalism emerges 
from historical experience; alternatively, it may reflect a conscious recognition 
that the different portions of the nation all vary significantly from one another, 
or at least that there are enough regional variations to merit granting every sub-
unit autonomy rights. 
Unitary nations, where the central government possesses plenary authority, 
sometimes have delimited regions that are perceived as distinctive or separate, 
often but not always as a result of their particular history or culture. Such 
regions are often granted some set of autonomy rights, even though the bulk of 
the nation is divided into provinces with no such rights. This approach can be 
described as particularized federalism. Nations that have adopted it include 
Italy, an otherwise unitary nation that has designated several autonomous 
regions, such as Sicily,
31




 28. Edward L. Rubin, Federalism as a Mode of Governance: Autonomy, Identity, Power and 
Rights (forthcoming) (on file with author). 
 29. See BELONGING: THE MEANING AND FUTURE OF CANADIAN CITIZENSHIP (William 
Kaplan ed., 1993) (discussing the history and features of the Canadian federalist system); BIDYUT 
CHAKRABARTY & RAJENDRA KUMAR PANDEY, INDIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 18–22, 35–
53 (2008) (discussing the uniqueness of the federalist system in India as it relates to authority 
between the central government and the states); LIEVEN DE WINTER & WILFRIED SWENDEN, THE 
POLITICS OF BELGIUM: INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY UNDER BIPOLAR AND CENTRIFUGAL 
FEDERALISM 2 (Marleen Brans et al. eds., 2009); KENNETH MCROBERTS, QUEBEC: SOCIAL 
CHANGE AND POLITICAL CRISIS 32–37 (3d ed. 1988) (discussing the impact of Canadian political 
institutions upon Quebec); M. GOVINDA RAO & NIRVIKAR SINGH, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
FEDERALISM IN INDIA 46–49, 95–96 (2005) (discussing India’s constitutional development 
toward a federalist system with the states retaining significant authority and recent decentralizing 
trends); JONATHAN STEINBERG, WHY SWITZERLAND? 77–78 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing the 
distinction between cantons and federal power). 
 30. My assessment of American federalism is that it was the result of historical necessity, 
not conscious choice, and became vestigial in a process of nationalization that began with the 
Civil War and advanced by the growth of the national administrative state. FEELEY & RUBIN, 
supra note 23, at 96–123. 
 31. SANDRA BENJAMIN, SICILY: THREE THOUSAND YEARS OF HUMAN HISTORY 387–91 
(2006); CHRISTOPHER DUGGAN, A CONCISE HISTORY OF ITALY 248–49 (1994). 
 32. See MICHAEL EAUDE, CATALONIA: A CULTURAL HISTORY (2008) (describing 
Catalonia’s history, its visual artists, and twentieth-century Catalonia); JOHN HOOPER, THE NEW 
SPANIARDS 217–82 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing the autonomy of various regions within Spain); 
MICHAEL KEATING, NATIONS AGAINST THE STATE: THE NEW POLITICS OF NATIONALISM IN 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1126 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1117 
even more recently in the U.K., which has granted increasing amounts of 
autonomy to Scotland, and only thereby avoided its secession.
33
 
Another version of particularized federalism occurs when the sub-unit that 
is granted federalist autonomy rights is not conceived as a region of the nation, 
but rather as the area inhabited by a particular group of people. Often, this 
approach is used for an aboriginal or indigenous population, like Indian tribes 
in the United States, the Aborigines in Australia, and the Yakuts in Russia.
34
 In 
contrast to the regionally defined approach, where the area granted autonomy 
is typically the same size as the decentralized provinces in the unitary part of 
the nation, the group or tribally defined approach can involve areas that are 
quite small relative to the remainder of the nation. 
Both comprehensive and particularized federalism grant autonomy rights 
to sub-units of the nation, but they often result from differing perspectives and 
motivations. A comprehensive federal regime is more likely to regard 
federalism as a defining feature, a way of structuring its overall approach to 
governance. Public authority is seen as being systematically allocated or 
divided, with some elements allocated to the central government and other 
allocated to the sub-units. Citizens of the regime tend to regard themselves as 
full members of the nation, but also as members of their sub-unit, with their 
loyalty divided between the two. Particularized federalism is frequently 
employed as a means of granting special privileges to a minority group or 
peripheral region, perhaps because of some perceived social or economic 
disadvantage that the members or inhabitant suffer. In other words, the regime 
is likely to regard itself, and be regarded by its majority inhabitants, as a 
unitary one with some exceptions being made for special situations. The 
inhabitants of the sub-units that have been granted autonomy will tend to 
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regard themselves as separate groups, with certain characteristics that create a 
sense of difference between themselves and the national majority. 
Neither the effort to define nor to categorize juridical federalism, however, 
should distract attention from Professor Gerken’s basic point. Managerial 
decentralization is a crucial aspect of governance, one that is of major concern 
for virtually every domestic policy that a modern nation carries out. It is 
generally more important, and invariably more regularly encountered, than 
questions of autonomy rights. No individual’s interaction with a modern state 
is fully, or even primarily defined, by constitutional rights; everyone is subject 
to a wide variety of regulatory restrictions and benefits of unquestioned 
constitutional validity, from social security, to motor vehicle licensing and 
operation. The same is true for the sub-units in a system of comprehensive 
juridical federalism, only more so. Their governments will generally have 
fewer rights than individuals and a greater range and complexity of interactions 
with the national government. Of course, this is truer still in a system of 
particularized juridical federalism, where the majority of governmental sub-
units have no autonomy rights, as well as in a system like the U.S., where “our 
father’s federalism” is vestigial. In all these systems, the important task for 
scholars is to identify and analyze the complex process by which the inevitably 
multi-level government carries out its tasks. 
III.  THE VALUE OF TWO-LEVEL GOVERNMENT AND AUTONOMY RIGHTS 
A second question that Professor Gerken raises, aside from the purposes 
that decentralization or “our federalism” serves, involves the value of this 
system. What is it supposed to accomplish, and is it successful in this effort? In 
attempting this rather formidable inquiry, the importance of terminological 
clarity is immediately apparent. It is necessary to know whether the system in 
question includes autonomy rights and for whom, or whether it is purely 
managerial in character. Each of these inquiries is complex, but they are 
different inquiries, and conflating them seems bound to confuse the issue, and 
perhaps re-ignite the war we should all be trying to escape, as Professor 
Gerken urges. 
Professor Feeley and I have argued that granting autonomy rights to a sub-
unit of the nation, as opposed to engaging in purely managerial 
decentralization, is primarily designed to deal with situations where people 
possess conflicting political identities.
35
 There are many reasons to grant 
authority to a political sub-unit of the nation, but why would the leaders or 
populace of that nation want to grant autonomy rights, that is, why would they 
want that grant of authority to be irretrievable? Resisting the temptation to use 
slavery as an example, one might turn to a contemporary issue such as medical 
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marijuana. Here is a classic case of sub-units generating diversity, serving as 
laboratories, and entering into political dialogue with the central government. 
It is also a case that will entice many people, particularly social progressives, 
to think kinder thoughts about “our federalism” in general, at least if they are 
not afflicted with Thomas Reed Powell’s version of a legal mind.
36
 
All very well, but this is an example of decentralization, not juridical 
federalism; the Supreme Court held that the federal government possessed the 
authority to enact a statutory ban on cannabis, in all its forms, and had done so 
in the Controlled Substances Act.
37
 If it seems that juridical federalism would 
have produced a similar or even preferable result, that is because the subject is 
currently a matter of debate within the country, with a significant number of 
people on each side and no normative consensus. Suppose the issue were 
cannibalism, rather than cannabis. Suppose one state had been taken over by a 
religious sect which endorsed the ritual consumption of human flesh. Would 
we be as philosophic about the value of diversity or would we want our 
national government to intervene and enforce the nation’s normative consensus 
on this matter? Would we want to have granted the sub-unit in question an 
irretrievable authority to control its criminal law? 
The only reason why a nation would want to grant some geographical sub-
unit an irretrievable authority is if the residents of that sub-unit possessed a 
different political identity from the nation as a whole. From the perspective of 
the majority, or alternatively the central government, granting autonomy rights 
might be the only way to hold the nation together under these circumstances. 
From the perspective of the residents or leadership of the sub-unit, autonomy 
rights might be a guarantee of recognition and self-government that is 
necessary for their willingness to remain within the larger nation. From a 
normative perspective, the test of real or juridical federalism, as opposed to 
garden-variety decentralization, is whether the system would allow a sub-unit 
of the polity to adopt values that are distinctly different from the prevailing 
values in the society at large. 
It is now unavoidable to invoke the example of slavery. When the U.S. 
Constitution was drafted, there was no clear normative consensus about the 
matter. A number of Southerners, including slaveholders such as Washington 
and Jefferson,
38
 harbored serious doubts about it, while it was legal in every 
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Northern state and prevalent in New York and New Jersey.
39
 Consequently, the 
issue could be compromised in the drafting process, and reduced to minor 
importance in the ratification debates that followed. By the middle of the 
nineteenth century, however, slavery had become morally anathema to 
Northerners.
40
 At that point, the grant of autonomy rights to Southern states 
that were committed to continuation of this “peculiar institution” became 
unacceptable to Northerners,
41
 who represented the majority of the nation. The 
normative deviation of the Southern states had become too severe to tolerate, 
and the federal structure of the nation that permitted this variation was rejected. 
But as Professor Gerken notes, very few of the real issues regarding 
national-state governmental relations involve autonomy rights. This is 
probably true even in nations where such rights continue to exist, and it is 
certainly true in the U.S., where they have become secondary or vestigial. 
Rather, these relations are determined by policy considerations that accompany 
the complex tasks of governance. What can be said about the value of “our 
federalism” in this context? Is it preferable to concentrate authority in the 
central government, and treat regional governments as mere instrumentalities 
of centralized control, or should authority be extensively decentralized, and 
regional governments granted extensive discretion to develop their own policy 
approaches? The answer, not surprisingly, is: “it depends.” Most obviously, it 
depends on the goals one is trying to achieve. But even if there is agreement 
about goals, the answer will still depend on a variety of pragmatic factors that 
makes generalization unconvincing, and perhaps impossible. 
One readily agreed upon goal is freedom, or liberty, which is often invoked 
as an argument for “our federalism,” usually with reasoning that applies to 
decentralization.
42
 But even a cursory catalogue of the world’s democratic 
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nations reveals no clear pattern. Nations that achieve top scores in the annual 
Freedom House survey are fairly evenly distributed between unified and 
juridically federal regimes.
43
 Of the high scoring nations in the list given in the 
previous section, for example, France, Japan, and the Netherlands are unitary, 
while Canada, Belgium, and Switzerland are federal. Is there any plausible 
claim that the first group is less free than the second? All these nations, and all 
the other nations on the Freedom House list, are decentralized to some extent 
of course, and certainly vary from one policy area to another. It would be 
difficult to determine which ones are more decentralized, on some overall 
measure, but it seems unlikely that any pattern would emerge on that basis 
either, given the range of nations that earn top scores. 
Another widely agreed upon criterion is government efficiency, that is, the 
effectiveness and expense with which the government carries out its assigned 
tasks. There are no Efficiency House ratings, and judgments in this case would 
be difficult, given the variety of tasks. It is easy enough to construct arguments 
for why either juridical federalism or higher levels of decentralization are more 
efficient and equally easy to construct arguments for the reverse. One might 
argue that decentralization works better in a large nation. But if the term 
“large” refers to population, then of the two nations that have more than one 
billion people, highly-centralized China (it even has a single time zone) seems 
more efficiently managed than juridically federal India. Among democratic 
nations, the federal status of the United States is unclear, as is that of Brazil. 
The nations immediately below Brazil in terms of population display no clear 
pattern: Germany has comprehensive juridical federalism, but Japan, France, 
Italy, and the U.K. use either a unitary or a particularized federal approach. 
Physical size might also be a consideration, but here again, the ambiguity of 
U.S. and Brazilian government makes judgment difficult. Canada has a robust 
form of juridical federalism, but that is a recent development, and it was 
motivated by considerations that had nothing to do with its size. France, the 
largest country in Western Europe, is unitary and probably one of the most 
centralized. The two European nations that probably have the best-developed 
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form of comprehensive juridical federalism, Belgium and Switzerland, are tiny 
by international standards. 
If one proceeds from simplistic considerations such as size and population 
to more subtle ones about government regulation and service delivery, it seems 
increasingly difficult to believe that any general rule about the desirability of 
juridical federalism will emerge and almost impossible to believe that a general 
rule can be framed about the desirable level of decentralization. This is not the 
counsel of despair; in fact, it is an academic opportunity. What is needed is 
microanalysis, that is, a detailed assessment of each nation and each policy 
area considered on its own terms.
44
 Generalizations are certainly possible; 
there are some tasks that are better performed central and others that are better 
decentralized. But in any given policy area, such tasks are likely to combine—
and conflict—in complex ways that must be traced on an individualized basis. 
This is the task that Professor Gerken’s Article sets for the academy. The 
next stage in American federalism scholarship—the one that will leave all our 
fathers behind—is to understand and assess the complex relationships between 
the national and state governments. The Supreme Court will continue to decide 
a federalism case every once in a while, and for the foreseeable future will 
probably reach differing conclusions based on Justice Kennedy’s mood at the 
moment. But the real decisions—the ones that implicate people’s lives and 
livelihoods—will be made by legislature and administrators. Those decisions 
are political, but they also constitute the law. It is time for legal scholars to 
leave the muddy battlefield of federalism doctrine behind and sally forth into 
the complex but fascinating topography that surrounds it on all sides. 
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